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FOREWORD
A decade ago, it was still possible to be surprised by historians’ lack of interest 
in late Socialism.1 Since then, the world of historiography has greatly changed. 
That period is the object of a frenzy of research, with frequent seminars and 
edited volumes.2 As happened with the Khrushchev Thaw in the early 2000s, the 
Brezhnev years have become a happy hunting ground for researchers. The twenty 
years (1964‑1985) between the Thaw and perestroika were a formative period for 
the “last Soviet generation,” which is still a sizeable proportion of the current popu‑
lation of the former republics of the USSR.3 The predominantly positive image of 
the Soviet past as a whole is largely based on people’s memories of their youth.4 
A golden age for many citizens in the ex‑Soviet republics, the period is less well 
known among historians: they find it hard to find a name for it, because its image 
is only revealed in contrast to the two periods of radical political change that 
came before and after it. “Stagnation,” Gorbachev’s term, has long been rejected; 
“developed” or “real socialism,” the regime’s own favoured label, can only now be 
used with scare quotes. The idea of applying the period names and concepts used 
in Western Europe and North America — the Sixties and Seventies — not only 
fails to reflect the wholeness of the Brezhnev period, but, not least, for all their 
1. Edwin Bacon, Mark Sandle, “Brezhnev Reconsidered,” in Edwin Bacon, Mark Sandle, 
eds., Brezhnev Reconsidered, (Basingstoke: Palgrave [Studies in Russian and East European 
History and Society], 2002), 1‑21.
2. Boris Belge, Martin Deuerlein, eds., Goldenes Zeitalter Der Stagnation? Perspektiven Auf 
Die Sowjetische Ordnung Der Breznev‑Ära (Tübingen, 2014); Marie‑Janine Calic, Dietmar 
Neutatz, and Julia Obertreis, eds., The Crisis of Socialist Modernity: The Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia in the 1970s (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); David Crowley, Susan 
E. Reid, Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc (Northwestern Univer‑
sity Press, 2010); Neringa Klumbyte, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, eds., Soviet Society in the Era of 
Late Socialism, 1964‑1985 (Lanham: Lexington Boks, 2013); The Socialist Sixties: Crossing 
Borders in the Second World (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013).
3. Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia’s Cold War Gene‑
ration, (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press [Oxford Oral History Series], 2012); 
Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More : The Last Soviet Generation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
4. According to opinion polls, Russians consider Brezhnev to have been the best leader in the 
country’s history, ahead of Stalin; and his term of office to have been an excellent time. Survey 
respondents in Russia tend to project the relative prosperity and stability of the Brezhnev years 
onto the earlier periods. “Epokhi v zhizni strany: El´tsyn, Gorbachev, Brezhnev,” accessed 
February 15, 2014, http://www.levada.ru/press/2011012601.html.
Cahiers du monde russe, 54/1‑2, Janvier‑juin 2013, p. 29‑46.
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practical use, these terms rapidly come up against limitations: Brezhnev’s Sixties 
were a continuation of the reforming optimism of the Soviet Fifties, rather than 
belonging to the triumph of consumer society as paraded by the market‑economy 
countries.5 The reason the 1970s are seen as the beginning of a new era in the capi‑
talist countries is that the oil crisis and the labour and ecological movements forced 
the economic model to adapt, while in the USSR, the Fordist production model 
was not changed until after 1986.6 In other words, the divisions of time habitually 
used for the history of the United States and Western Europe do not really fit the 
history of late Socialism. This issue of Cahiers joins the recent boom in studies of 
the Brezhnev years with a series of 22 articles in two volumes debating trends in 
current historiography.7
The studies that have given new life to the historiographical approach to the 
society, culture and consumption of the Brezhnev years8 share the characteristic of 
examining the growing mismatch between an authoritarian, conservative geron‑
tocracy and a society undergoing change and emancipation. Earlier historiography 
interpreted the contrast between ossified state structures and social dynamics at the 
individual level with the image of a homo sovieticus torn between lip‑service to 
the official ideology, ritually repeated, and escape into the private world of family, 
friends and hobbies.
To belie this supposed cynicism and pretence attributed to Soviet citizens under 
late socialism, Alexei Yurchak and Sergei Zhuk have sought to escape the binary 
contrast between external appearance and private convictions, simulated agreement 
in public rituals and dissimulated opinions in private.9 This dichotomy can be found 
everywhere: authors contrast the dynamism of informal trade with the sclerosis 
of the planned economy, dissident art with official commissions, and nationalities 
that were Socialist in form and nationalist in substance (rather than the reverse). 
Yurchak shows that the repetition of self‑referential rituals and the circularity of 
the authorities’ discourse did not exclude sincere belief in the ideals of Socialism, 
thereby refuting the reproach of hypocrisy. Similarly, participation in the activities 
5. Contra Anne E.  Gorsuch, Diane Koenker, “Introduction: The Socialist Sixties in Global 
Perspective,” in Anne E. Gorsuch, Diane Koenker, eds. The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders 
in the Second World, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013), 1‑21.
6. On the 1970s: Niall Ferguson, et al., eds., The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard university press, 2010); Calic, Neutatz, Ober‑
treis, éds., « Introduction », in The Crisis of Socialist Modernity, 7‑27.
7. Cahiers du Monde russe, CFP “Beyond Brezhnevism” available at http://monderusse.revues.
org/7499
8. Natalya Chernyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era, (New York: Rout‑
ledge [BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 90], 2013); Raleigh, 
Soviet Baby Boomers; Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More; Sergei I. 
Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dnieprope‑
trovsk, 1960‑1985 (Washington, D.C. – Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010).
9. Generalised to Soviet history as a whole: Anna Krylova, “The Tenacious Liberal Subject in 
Soviet Studies,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1, 1 (2000): 119‑146.
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of the official social structures (komsomol) did not prevent the pursuit of personal 
desires and ambitions whose meaning apparently contradicted the doctrine; on the 
contrary, it made it licit to set up new activities, such as pop and rock groups within 
the komsomol. Zhuk joins in the major points of this criticism of the duplicity 
of homo sovieticus, but with one considerable reservation: the displacements of 
meaning made possible by semantic withdrawal from the official discourse could 
not occur without causing considerable alarm among ideological and police func‑
tionaries. The guardians of ideology in the closed city of Dnepropetrovsk had no 
intention of allowing their flock the freedom to gambol in unapproved ways, and 
used a graduated armoury of effective punitive measures to deal with the recalcitrant 
(including the Gulag), even though by the end of the decade they had to admit that 
they had lost the battle against the influence of Western popular culture. Similarly, 
Sonja Luehrmann shows that the official ideology’s promotion of “spiritual values” 
and “personal development” was taken seriously by people working within the 
ideological apparatus as mere agitators. This encouragement of spirituality, far 
from involving a “revival of religious feelings,” which Luehrmann disputes, was 
seen as an “antidote to religion.” However, those who believed in these ideas devel‑
oped aspirations that they now connect to their religious commitment following the 
collapse of the Soviet system.
The golden age of the Soviet century
The decades of Brezhnev’s rule correspond to the peak of the Soviet period: the 
USSR, at last an uncontested super‑power thanks to a Soviet nuclear arsenal the 
equal of the United States’, fulfilled its promises of public order, secure social 
mobility and a degree of material well‑being. In the belief that this would guarantee 
stability, the regime carried out a cruel repression of members of the marginal 
classes and malcontents.
It is usual to split this period into two phases, with positive developments while 
Brezhnev still enjoyed good health and could envisage energetic reform; and “stag‑
nation” during which Brezhnev, physically and mentally diminished after his 1974 
stroke, was kept at his post as a symbolic figure by the gerontocracy.10 The exact 
chronology depends on the sector: in economics, the divide is between the high 
growth rates of Brezhnev’s first decade, in line with a certain reforming spirit, and, 
from 1973, a decade of slower growth coinciding with the refusal of any extensive 
reform.11 In the arts, the opening up that extended the Thaw was ended by the inva‑
sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: de‑Stalinisation stopped and the liberal dissident 
10. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted : The Soviet Collapse, 1970‑2000 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 48‑49.
11. Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the 
USSR from 1945, Postwar World (London – New York: Longman, 2003), 98‑99; Nicolas 
Werth, Histoire de l’Union Soviétique de Khrouchtchev À Gorbatchev (1953‑1991), 3rd ed. 
(PUF, 2007), 463‑464.
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movement was muzzled.12 In foreign policy, the division is between détente culmi‑
nating in the 1975 Helsinki Accords and a new “tepid” war following the invasion 
of Afghanistan.13
And yet, the eighteen years of Brezhnev’s rule do have a unity that makes 
them stand out in the century: Soviet citizens at last achieved some modest mate‑
rial prosperity and predictable upward socio‑occupational mobility. Although it 
had begun under Khrushchev, the policy of stabilising the careers of junior and 
senior officials was enshrined in Brezhnev’s “trust in cadres” slogan.14 In contrast 
with the rest of Russia’s 20th century, the 1960s to 1980s stand out for their 
moderation and serenity: no major domestic upheavals, no armed confrontations 
on the borders of the USSR,15 no “top‑down revolution”, no state terror against 
the general population. After a tumultuous Khrushchev decade ending with the 
massacre of demonstrating workers in Novocherkassk in 1962, the barometer of 
popular anger was set fair under Brezhnev.16 The series of “mass disturbances” 
(massovye besporiadki) against the political and police authorities came to a 
temporary end, and only resumed in the mid‑1980s.17 Further evidence of this 
pacification is that the prison camps held a historically low number of political 
prisoners: offenders sentenced per year fell from a thousand in the latter half 
of the 1950s to a few hundred in 1961‑1985.18 Society appeared therefore to be 
generally peaceful compared with the upheavals of the Thaw and perestroika that 
occurred before and after the Brezhnev years. And even more so when compared 
with the dissident movements occurring in the capitalist countries at that time: 
violent clashes between students and police in 1968, protests against the Vietnam 
War, extreme right‑ and left‑wing terrorism in Germany and Italy. Admittedly, 
the USSR suffered more from terrorism than is generally thought, but it did not 
12. Polly Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 
1953‑70, Eurasia Past and Present (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 212‑257; Denis 
Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 429‑432.
13. Andreï Kozovoï, Par‑Delà Le Mur : La Culture de Guerre Froide Soviétique Entre 
Deux Détentes (P.: Complexe, 2009); Ragna Boden, “Soviet World Policy in the 1970s: 
A Three‑Level Game,” in The Crisis of Socialist Modernity: The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
in the 1970s, in Calic, Neutatz, and Obertreis, eds., 184‑203.
14. Yoram Gorlizki, “Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks 
under Brezhnev,” Slavic Review 69, 3 (October 1, 2010): 676‑700.
15. With the exception of the violent Sino‑Soviet clashes on the River Ussuri in 1969, Lorenz 
M. Lüthi, The Sino‑Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
university press, 2008), 340‑342.
16. Samuel H. Baron, Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union: Novocherkassk, 1962 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
17. Vladimir Kozlov, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Hrushcheve. 1953‑ nachalo 1980‑kh gg 
[Mass disturbances in the USSR under Khruschev. From 1953 to the beginning of the 1980’s], 
3rd ed. (М.: ROSSPEN, 2010), 421.
18. V. Kozlov, « Kramola : Inokamyslie v SSSR vo vremena N. Hrushcheva, I.L. Brezhneva 
(Po materialam Verkhovnova Suda i Prokuratury SSSR),” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremen‑
nosti, no. 3 (2002): 84.
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see the political agitation typical of capitalist societies as the 1960s gave way to 
the 1970s.19
This was largely the tranquillity of dungeons, as Jean‑Jacques Rousseau would 
have put it. The “preventive conversations” held on KGB premises and the “treat‑
ment” of the recalcitrant in punitive psychiatric establishments showed that by the 
latter half of the 1960s the new political leadership had overhauled its arsenal of 
legal and illegal measures for silencing dissident voices. The papers by Sergei Zhuk, 
Susanne Schattenberg and Amanda Swain demonstrate the considerable clout of the 
political police in social life: it was the KGB that allowed or prevented scientists’ 
travel abroad, at a time when such exchanges were increasingly important for their 
careers. The KGB arranged the surveillance of personalities suspected of diverging 
from the official line and initiated the prosecution of teenagers who had taken part 
in unauthorised assemblies. The official ideological discourse remained inflexible. 
Nikolai Mitrokhin examines the fountainhead of content for official propaganda, 
the ideology department of the Central Committee. Basically conservative in their 
convictions, the guardians of ideology acted as intermediaries between the KGB 
and the media (publishers, writers, journalists, etc.). Schattenberg describes how 
Andrei Sakharov, the famous physicist and loyal Soviet citizen, attempted to push 
the limits of free speech via dialogue with the authorities. On the other side, some 
Politburo members, such as the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, sought this 
dialogue with Sakharov in order to point out that he had gone too far and to get him 
to backtrack. However, these attempts foundered on the Politburo’s refusal to pursue 
the policy of opening up to expertise that had been promoted under Khrushchev. 
In her study of the coverage of the 18 May 1972 demonstration in Kaunas, 
Lithuania, Swain shows how those involved sought to define these embarrassing 
events in such a way as to escape being described as “nationalist,” which would 
have had disastrous consequences for both the young demonstrators and the police 
and local politicians. They all stood behind a damage‑limitation version whereby 
the fault belonged to the gregarious instincts of “politically unaware” youths led 
astray by mysterious “hippies” influenced by Western culture.
Despite the repression, acceptance of the regime does seem to have had its 
heyday under Brezhnev.20 Much of this was due to a wide conservative consensus: 
the law and order regime imposed by the new leaders was directed mainly at 
marginal groups, with drastic measures taken against “hooligans”, in order to 
reassure a population unsettled by the insecurity of the 1940s and 1950s.21 Larissa 
Zakharova gives the poignant example of a social trajectory of exclusion in the 
19. Three Moscow bombings in 1977 attributed to Armenian nationalists (Kozlov, 435), 
frequent aircraft hijack attempts from 1970, often intended for escapes abroad.
20. Kotkin, Armageddon, 44, speaks of a brief symbiosis between the population and 
the authorities.
21. Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of 
Reform after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Brian LaPierre, Hooligans in 
Khrushchev’s Russia: Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance during the Thaw (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).
34 MARC ELIE, ISABELLE OHAYON
Gulag. Although there were fewer political prisoners, the Gulag population even‑
tually peaked at over a million in 1979, one of the highest incarceration rates in the 
world at that time: 420 prisoners per 100,000 population.22
“Bearable” Socialism
However, the main reason the Brezhnev years were a unique period of “bearable” 
Socialism, as Vladimir Kusin puts it,23 was that most Soviet citizens were now 
enjoying a historically high standard of living. Starting in the 1950s, consump‑
tion made it easier to support the regime and its values, or at least come to a tacit 
“little deal.”24 The economic slowdown in the 1970s did not involve an equivalent 
slowdown in consumption, which continued to grow at an annual rate of 1.9% 
while GDP growth stagnated at 0.9% during the 1973‑1982 period.25 This was 
only possible because of the flow of petrodollars the USSR earned after the sharp 
rise in the oil price in 1973: even as the country was bogged down in its structural 
difficulties, high‑cost gas and oil exports enabled it for twelve or so years to sustain 
consumption, invest in agriculture, continue the arms race and fund costly military 
incursions (Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea).
When the OPEC countries decided to sharply raise the cost of gas and oil, the 
deposits in Western Siberia, discovered in the 1950s, were pumping at full capacity. 
Pipelines now brought Orenburg gas directly to Western Europe for hard cash. 
Economic crisis, détente and the West German Social Democrats’ Ostpolitik led 
to profitable contracts: Germans, Czechoslovaks and Soviets worked together to 
build the Soiuz, Bratstvo, Druzhba and Transgas pipelines. From being a net gas 
and oil importer, the USSR had in two decades become one of the world’s largest 
producers and exporters. This high price regime until 1986 made it possible not 
only to mask the structural weaknesses of the Soviet industrial apparatus but also 
to shelve the economic reforms that had been designed in the 1960s. The rude 
awakening only occurred on Gorbachev’s watch.26 Consequently, the term “crisis,” 
even within the phrase “economic crisis” also appears to us to be inappropriate to 
describe the Brezhnev period.27 It may well be that this reflects a fairly clear differ‑
ence within the Communist bloc between the USSR and the Socialist countries of 
22. Compared with fewer than 200 in the United States, before the “successes” of the “war 
against drugs” shot that country in a few short years to the rank of uncontested leader of the 
penitentiary utopia, with imprisonment rates comparable to those of Stalin’s Gulag.
23. Quoted by Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 99.
24. James R.  Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” 
Slavic Review 44, 4 (1985): 694‑706.
25. Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 99.
26. Kotkin, Armageddon, 15‑16; Frank Bösch, “1973: Energiewende Nach Osten,” Die 
Zeit, October 18, 2013, sec. Geschichte, http://www.zeit.de/2013/42/1973‑gas‑pipeline‑ 
sowjetunion‑gazprom..
27. Contra Calic, Neutatz, and Obertreis, “Introduction.”
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Central and Eastern Europe: the latter were indeed caught up in a serious financial 
crisis that forced them into debt and increasing dependence on Western finance.28 
The 1973 oil shock hit them via their economic links with Western Europe, whereas 
the USSR, providing them with gas and oil, prospered from the high prices. The 
satellites’ greater exposure to the Sixties’ youth culture undermined the alterna‑
tive model of Soviet development, which was anyway more recent for them and 
less ingrained. Ultimately, the striking characteristic of the development of the 
Communist bloc was its centrifugal forces: not only the political split with China, 
Albania, and, to a lesser extent, Romania and Yugoslavia, but not least the gradual 
economic drift of the “popular democracies” away from the USSR, whose integra‑
tion model had lost its authority when compared with an EEC now able to include 
the former dictatorships of Southern Europe.29
Leisure and consumption increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and really 
took off in the Brezhnev years.30 The introduction of the five‑day week, longer 
holidays, more private cars and rising wages all helped develop a private sphere; in 
urban areas, family flats and individual dachas in the nearby countryside were being 
fitted out with domestic appliances. Rising consumption and easier travel even 
affected villages: kolkhoz workers now received pensions and salaries (instead of 
trudodni), and with their new internal passports could travel freely. Leisure time 
was increasingly filled with activities often officially encouraged, whether or not 
they were run by the “social organisations”: gardening, do‑it‑yourself, hill‑walking 
and travel, physical exercise, personal well‑being, etc.31 Olga Smolyak and Aleksey 
Golubev give the striking example of the development of do‑it‑yourself and manual 
skills, which both made up for the scarcity of certain goods and carved out areas for 
personal satisfaction. Illustrated magazines set the tone for the new standards of the 
modern Soviet citizen and reinforced the gendered division of daily life — women 
involved in interior decorating, gardening and fashion; men devoted to their hobbies 
of building models, amateur radios, etc. This development of the personal sphere 
was clearly reflected in the popular press and more generally in the representations 
shown in the arts and media.
The world of consumption was particularly open to goods and cultural prod‑
ucts from abroad, whether Socialist or capitalist countries, whose standards 
helped form Soviet taste: Western Europe and the United States were still seen 
as a benchmark in the USSR, which was going to demonstrate the superiority of 
28. Stephen Kotkin, “The Kiss of Debt. The East Bloc Goes Borrowing,” in Ferguson et al., 
eds., The Shock of the Global, 80‑93.
29. Poul Villaume, Odd Arne Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, 
Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965‑1985 (Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum 
Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2010).
30. Nadège Ragaru, Antonela Capelle‑Pogacean, eds., Vie Quotidienne et Pouvoirs Sous Le 
Communisme: La Consommation Revisitée, (Paris: Karthala [Recherches Internationales], 
2010); Chernyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era.
31. Christian Noack, “Songs from the Wood, Love from the Fields: The Soviet Tourist Song 
Movement,” in Gorsuch, Koenker, eds., The Socialist Sixties, 167‑192. 
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the Socialist consumer model by meeting material desires without the excesses of 
consumerism.32 Consumer and cultural goods from capitalist countries occupied an 
increasingly large place, because the Soviet state used its petrodollars to stimulate 
consumption, and also because clothes, books and records were smuggled in from 
west to east.
Another aspect of opening up to foreign countries, travel — mainly to the popular 
democracies, but also the capitalist countries — provided intensely felt interactions 
not to be measured in the quantity of goods acquired. Igor´ Narskii and Zhuk assess 
the impact on carefully selected Soviet citizens of travelling to the United States. 
Narsky shows how the dancers of an amateur troupe from Cheliabinsk were caught 
up in the constraints of Cold War culture. Diplomatic and ideological objectives 
and officious control of the dancers’ behaviour and contacts during their foreign 
tours weighed heavily on the arrangement of the trips and even their programmes 
and choreography. Although the dancers had taken on board at least some of the 
official clichés about foreign countries, they still underwent a culture shock when 
they travelled to the United States in 1979. Zhuk reports that the experts on North 
America, the “Americanists” who were allowed to travel to the USA formed an 
elite among researchers. They adopted various narrative strategies in their writing 
to share the interpretative advances they had made during their investigations, 
reading and, not least, meeting American colleagues.
This exposure to foreign countries affected behaviour as much as ideas. 
As Alexei Popov shows, comparison with other Socialist or capitalist countries 
obliged the authorities to improve the organisation of the service sector, particu‑
larly for major international events such as the Olympics 1980: foreign guests 
had to be offered facilities up to the standards of the international hotel sector. 
The USSR lagged far behind in this area, with the result that for the first time in 
its history it mobilised its economy for a sector other than industry and agricul‑
ture. This opened the way for a post‑industrial economy led by the tertiary sector. 
However, for all the resources deployed to update Soviet enterprises, the refusal to 
introduce private initiative or market mechanisms reduced these efforts to a virtu‑
ally unrepeated experiment.
“Bearable” Socialism was also made possible by the relaxation of some 
controls under Kosygin’s economic reform. Simon Huxtable analyses how 
aligning print runs and distribution with demand (rather than according to fixed 
quotas) challenged the propaganda nature of editorial content and the vocation 
of educating the masses that had habitually been attributed to newspapers since 
the birth of the Soviet system. The new role played by popularity and readers’ 
opinions forced the journalists on Komsomol´skaia Pravda to define the tastes of 
their assumed average reader. They emphasised the ordinary activities and pref‑
erences that underpinned the identity of a middling class. A similar trend can be 
noted in films: the “experimental artistic studio of the cinema” examined by Irina 
32. Susan Reid, David Crowley, eds., Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern 
Bloc, (Northwestern University Press, 2010), 21 et seq. 
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Tcherneva was allowed a certain organisational freedom in exchange for compli‑
ance with the requirement of a minimum level of profitability. Although this 
experiment was limited, the studio had to take account of a wide range of audi‑
ences and to some extent move away from the educational function the Soviet 
cinema had been given until then.
In the world of theatre, the Brezhnev period marked the emergence of an 
increasingly asserted creative autonomy, particularly on the fringe of the dominant 
locations and legitimate professional spheres. As Susan Constanzo demonstrates 
in her article on amateur theatricals in the provincial towns of the RSFSR, this 
freedom was achieved by negotiation and connivance with the local authorities 
supervising the troupes, whether houses of culture, clubs, or regional or komsomol 
cultural departments. Support for amateur groups was a way of making up for the 
crying lack of professional theatres in the provinces and having a cultural life on 
the cheap. Distance from the centre and interdependence between the troupes and 
local authority structures made it possible to put on controversial plays and, by 
creating a precedent, helped remove the plays from the banned list. The Ilkhom 
Theatre in Tashkent, described by Lucille Lisack, also demonstrates the rela‑
tionship between distance from Moscow and political and artistic audacity and 
formal innovation. It quickly gained a wide audience by introducing a new theat‑
rical discourse and adapting plays that were controversial or even actually banned, 
while attempting to mirror an age and a generation of Soviet conformity ground 
down by routine. The Ilkhom Theatre became in this way a central institution for 
the counterculture in Tashkent, and is now idealised as an exceptional moment in 
the city’s collective memory.
Disenchantment or ideological withdrawal?
The Brezhnev years are usually described as being a time of disenchantment 
with the Soviet dream and of ideological crisis. At the top, the new political 
leadership was careful not to make any specific promises about the date of arrival 
of Communism, i.e., a society without classes, with no State and no currency, 
after the abolition of private property. Individualism, consumerism and cynicism 
seemed to have won out over Communist values as the Khrushchev leadership 
had defined them in its 1961 “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism.” That 
the Communist society announced by Khrushchev in 1961 had not arrived by 
1980, and was not even in sight, surprised no one. In addition to ideological 
exhaustion there was the priority the political leadership had given to enhancing 
well‑being, placing the regime in direct competition with foreign countries. 
Soviet citizens could see for themselves the contrast in development during their 
increasingly frequent trips abroad, especially to the “popular democracies,” some 
of which, like Hungary, had adopted forms of Socialist development that differed 
from the Soviet model. Legal and illegal imports of consumer goods from capi‑
talist countries showed that the industrial and commercial gap was widening. 
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The command economy that the government refused to reform was losing all 
credit in the eyes of Soviet citizens. After all, what was the point of Socialism if 
it wasn’t better than capitalism?33
However, the disappearance of the ideal of a Communist society and the expan‑
sion of consumerist and individualist behaviour did not result in undermining the 
legitimacy of the Soviet regime, desacralising Socialist ideals or discrediting the 
scientific and technical progress their society had achieved.34 First, the satisfaction 
of material needs by imports was a factor in reducing discontent, and therefore 
strengthening the regime rather than weakening it, especially since that satisfaction 
was in line with the Socialist project of material well‑being.35 Second, the Soviet 
state had not given up its plans for transforming nature and society,36 even if it 
now advanced more cautiously than before. As part of a major investment policy 
of building new towns (Tol´iatti37) and huge transport infrastructure (pipelines, 
BAM38) the leadership was also pushing ahead with the project of the century: to 
divert the northern and Siberian rivers to flow towards the deserts of Central Asia. 
The building of the Kapchagay reservoir in Kazakhstan encouraged the megalo‑
maniac dreams of politicians in the regions, the republics and Moscow. However, 
Tetsuro Chida shows that technical experts, like those in Europe, were already 
moving towards a more “reflective modernity” that questioned its own impetus and 
focused on anticipating danger, unlike the thinking under Stalin and Khrushchev. 
Ultimately, the dam was built on a less grand scale with less impact on nature and 
dependant industrial activity, revealing a political indecisiveness Chida sees as 
characteristic of the Brezhnev years.
Fabien Bellat agrees with Chida that the indecisiveness of leaders about infra‑
structure policy was characteristic of the period. In his paper on the architecture 
of the Brezhnev years, he challenges the usual vision of uniform buildings by 
analysing the effect of many factors leading to diversity in architects’ practice and 
achievements. The result was an architecture that might be monotonous or inven‑
tive, as we look at the culturally marked designs adopted in the republics of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, or the vastly ambitious town planning schemes devised 
for the city of Tol´iatti.
33. Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy,129‑130; Kotkin, Armageddon, 19.
34. Agreeing with Calic, Neutatz, Obertreis, “Introduction,” 19.
35. Ragaru, Capelle‑Pogacean, Vie Quotidienne et Pouvoirs Sous Le Communisme, 18, 22
36. Marc Elie, «  Coping with the “Black Dragon”: Mudflow Hazards and the Controversy 
over the Medeo Dam in Kazakhstan, 1958‑66 », Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History, 14, 2 (2013): 313‑342.
37. Lewis H.  Siegelbaum, “Modernity Unbound: The New Soviet City of the Sixties,” in 
Gorsuch, Koenker, eds., The Socialist Sixties, 66‑83.
38. Christopher Ward, Brezhnev’s Folly: The Building of BAM and Late Soviet Socia‑
lism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Johannes Grützmacher, Die 
Baikal‑Amur‑Magistrale : vom stalinistischen Lager zum Mobilisierungsprojekt unter Breznev 
(München: Oldenbourg, 2012).
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On the front of social relations, although Brezhnev is generally described as 
having given up the Khrushchev era’s utopian dream of controlling private space 
by comrades’ courts and “byt” policy,39 Moritz Florin shows that Moscow used 
authoritarian methods to completely alter household life in Kyrgyz villages by 
replacing compound walls (duval) with openwork fences that exposed private 
life to social control. Not least, “for the Party, consumption was an excellent 
factor of modernisation”: furniture (tables, chairs, beds), cutlery and domestic 
appliances introduced into these homes were all instruments of Europeanisation/
Russification that had reached Kyrgyz home life. Along with them went a family 
model, Soviet but still conservative, whereby women had most responsibility for 
the home. This “selective modernisation” under Brezhnev, sparing the traditional 
yurts and religious rites, had a real attraction for the rural population, despite 
the embittered scepticism of the cultural elites about consumer civilisation. 
The paper’s focus on the Kyrgyz republic suggests that there is an imbalance in 
Brezhnev‑era research, which concentrates almost entirely on the major cities of 
the European USSR, leading probably to an over‑estimation and generalisation 
of the relaxation of social engineering in the attempts to transform society. 
The disappearance of the Communist utopia did not put an end to the Socialist 
ideals of equality, personal development, collectivism and technical and social 
progress. These widely shared Socialist values were consolidated, outside the 
propaganda apparatus, in interpersonal relations. Zakhkarova shows how the long 
correspondence between a prisoner and a famous writer was a form of personal 
transformation: the emergence of a literate friendship turned this “particularly 
dangerous recidivist,” excluded from society and held in the harshest of condi‑
tions, into a Soviet citizen capable of re‑integration. His correspondent, acting as 
a tutor, mediator and guarantor, was in turn changed by this exchange of letters 
in her ways of writing and helping people. The papers we are publishing there‑
fore do not reveal a weakening of Socialist ideals, but rather their reinforce‑
ment in social practices. Nevertheless, although there was no economic collapse 
or challenge to the regime’s legitimacy, does that mean there was no crisis? 
Not quite.
Crisis of time and new regime of historicity
In the 1970s, Soviet time entered a crisis. The future horizon of Communism 
was replaced by an undefined “advanced Socialism”: the vast scale proposed by 
Marxist‑Leninist doctrine gave way to a paltry, purposeless pragmatism offering 
no step‑changes in quality. This crisis of future dreams came with a crisis of past 
39. Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices, 
(Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press [Studies on the History of Society and Culture 
32], 1999); Deborah A. Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia 
(Peter Lang, 2007).
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dreams: starting in 1956, the Stalinist discourse inherited from the Short course 
(Kratkii kurs) was being challenged by historians, writers, intellectuals and 
representatives of nationalist opinions.40 The country’s traumatic past of Stalin’s 
purges and war could no longer be covered up by an optimistic drive towards 
the future: this past contained deep wounds that could no longer be justified by 
placing them against the prospects of linear progress leading to the achievement 
of a better society.
And yet, defining historical time was always a major preoccupation of the Soviet 
power structure. History and memory were instruments of Bolshevik and then 
Stalinist ideology, which based its political programme on the construction of a 
narrative of mythical origins and founding figures (Lenin, the Civil War, etc.), the 
starting point and viewpoint for a projected higher purpose, with the application of 
considerable propaganda resources. During the Thaw, the manipulation of people’s 
relationship with time continued: the present successes of the conquest of space 
and its applications enabled Soviet citizens to look forward to a future in a typically 
modern vision of history marching in a single direction towards progress (both 
social and technical). Looking back, the Soviet regime under Brezhnev painted a 
heroicised vision of the past with the cult of the Second World War.41 But now the 
authorities were being forced to face the less controllable deployment of social 
practices of time that did not fit into this framework.
We may hypothesise that the USSR of Brezhnev’s Socialism began to shift into 
a presentist regime of historicity, marked by a crisis in the heroic narrative, disen‑
chantment and loss of faith in the future, in parallel with the process occurring in 
Western Europe in the latter half of the 20th century.42 The excessive focus on 
heritage and retrospection was both a response to and a symptom of this shift, and 
the construction of a painstakingly consistent past contrasted with a present that 
was complex, tortured and reflective.43 
Denis Kozlov has described as a “historical turn” in late Soviet culture 
the new historical awareness of the educated fringe of Soviet society after 
de‑Stalinisation. One of the strategies for undermining the official clichés was 
meticulous research into historical facts fired by biographical exploration and 
40. Sergei I.  Zhuk, “‘Cultural Wars’ in the Closed City of Soviet Ukraine, 1959‑1982,” in 
Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964‑1985, in Klumbyte, Sharafutdinova, eds., 
Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism 67‑90; Yitzhak Brudny, Reinventing Russia. 
Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953‑1991 (Cambridge [UK] – New York: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Nikolai Mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia : Dvizhenie Russkikh natsiona‑
listov v SSSR 1953‑1985 [Le parti russe: Le mouvement des nationalistes russes en URSS 
1953‑1985] (М.: NLO, 2003).
41. Nina Tumarkin, The Living & the Dead : The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II 
in Russia (New York  NY: Basic Books, 1994); Jonathan Brunstedt, “Building a Pan‑Soviet 
Past: The Soviet War Cult and the Turn Away from Ethnic Particularism,” The Soviet and 
Post‑Soviet Review 38, 2 (September 1, 2011): 149‑171, doi:10.1163/187633211X589114.
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43. François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité. Présentisme et expériences du temps (P.: Éditions 
du Seuil, 2012).
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detailed reconstruction. The feverish enthusiasm that greeted “factographic”44 
historical publications revealed the increasingly unacceptable nature of official 
representations of the past for a society wracked with doubt and engaged in a 
gradual re‑examination of conventional social values and historical interpretations. 
Although these texts contained gross simplifications and never challenged the 
Soviet conceptual armoury, they and their readers turned the debate about factual 
history into a way of discussing contemporary social and cultural questions, and 
even issues of identity.45 Investigation of the past occupied the present and served 
it. In her paper, Polly Jones shows how the process whereby the son of the Civil 
War general Trifonov wrote his biography deeply involved witnesses of the period, 
readers and senior publishers. By disputing his facts or providing new evidence, 
their reactions were the first signs of a new look at the de‑Stalinised myths and 
the controversies around figures who had been physically eliminated and removed 
from the Soviet narrative during the Great Terror. These reactions also revealed the 
importance of memory issues for Soviet citizens of the first and second generations 
concerning the period when the USSR was set up.
Another aspect of this retrospection can be seen in the emergence and expansion 
of the heritage movement. The All‑Russia Society for Protection of Monuments of 
History and Culture (VOOPIiK), founded in 1965, marks this same “historical turn” 
since it focused on the physical remains of pre‑Revolutionary heritage. The drive 
to preserve architectural heritage, even religious buildings, met a general public 
demand and was based on the desire to reconcile historical experience with contem‑
porary reality: protecting and rehabilitating the physical traces of the past not out 
of nostalgia but in order to integrate them into contemporary knowledge and life, 
and so make sense of the present.46 Amateurs and professionals were involved in 
this heritage movement, breaking down the barriers between history and heritage, 
often at a purely local level that could still contribute to a wider “national” search. 
Catriona Kelly shows that, starting in the 1960s, the ideological principles that 
required destroying or downplaying any traces of pre‑Revolutionary culture were 
breaking down, and it was no longer unthinkable to defend churches as an integral 
part of heritage, to ask for them to be restored or even rebuilt from scratch, and 
indeed to place them in the centre of rehabilitation plans for Leningrad’s historic 
city centre. These initiatives did not come from a top‑down political decision but 
from overwhelmingly local pressure. This revealed a groundswell in educated 
Soviet society, retreating to national values and symbols taken from history.
44. Denis Kozlov, “The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture: Retrospectivism, Factography, 
Doubt, 1953‑1991,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 2, 3 (Summer 
2001): 577‑600, 578‑581. Taken from the Russian “faktografiia”, the accumulation of facts 
with no analysis or generalisation.
45. See also Zhuk’s analysis in this volume of the factographic approach as a way for United 
States historians to escape censorship.
46. Concerning the twists and turns of religious monument conservation in the 1950s and 
1960s, see Anne Kropotkine, “Les ambiguïtés du Dégel,” Cahiers du Monde russe. 47, 1‑2 
(January‑June, 2006): 269‑302, doi:10.4000/monderusse.3802.
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This “conservationist” movement produced arguments that tended towards 
nationalist thinking and foreshadowed the actual arrival of that thinking47 in a 
well‑known process of inventing/re‑inventing tradition that was also expressed 
in other heritage “monuments” such as food, the subject of Adrianne Jacobs’s 
paper. The prolific cookbook author V.V. Pokhlebkin stressed the prime impor‑
tance of an authentic national cuisine over the nutritional recommendations of 
Soviet hygienism and Western imperialism. This gastronomic historicism was an 
overt return to the past and tradition, a clear desire to re‑educate Russians in the 
real tastes of their own cuisine, convivial and pleasurable in nature, better than 
any set of imposed standards for guaranteeing good health. The heritage phenom‑
enon, part of public policy at All‑Union level, was not restricted to European 
Russia. Architectural renovation and heritage conservation could also be seen in 
Samarkand, declared “oldest city in the USSR,”48 Yerevan, where archaeolog‑
ical research was made use of by the proponents of cultural heritage to construct 
memories49, and Tbilisi, where initiatives both institutional and informal devel‑
oped to restore places of worship in particular.50
A generation gap can be seen in the social practice of time. The youngest gener‑
ations display two types of attitude. Some of them complied with the ideas put 
forward by the authorities, appropriating the cult of the Second World War within 
specifically designed political and institutional organisations: when Brezhnev 
introduced the public holiday commemorating the victory of 9 May in 1965, the 
komsomol, covered by the media, was in charge of promoting the memory of 
the War, its heroes and the exploits of the Red Army. This patriotic construction 
encountered a degree of support. One example is the beskozyrka (sailor’s cap) 
ritual described by Vicky Davis, in which since 1968 young men in Novorossiisk 
have celebrated the liberation of the Black Sea port by the Soviet regiment working 
from the stronghold of Malaya Zemlya, whose name happened to be chosen for the 
first volume of Brezhnev’s memoirs. Although he had only played a minor part in 
this operation, Brezhnev got the local authorities to indulge in an exercise of mutual 
self‑congratulation by awarding the city the Order of the Great Patriotic War. 
The cult of this feat, which kept its popularity for many years, was then adopted 
locally by the official youth movement, who turned it into an act of romantic and 
highly patriotic virility. Brezhnev’s “memoirs,” whose origins are entertainingly 
traced by Nikolaus Katzer, were also an attempt to give young people a model 
Soviet trajectory with fewer pretentions. In the three volumes, corresponding 
47. Brudny, Reinventing Russia, sees VOOPIiK as a cradle for Russian nationalism; Silvia 
Serrano identifies groups of nationalist Georgian students who took the initiative to restore 
churches in the name of Georgian heritage and national identity, in “Religion, pouvoir, iden‑
tités en Géorgie post‑soviétique,” HDR, directed by Patrick Michel, EHESS, 2014.
48. Drevneishii gorod SSSR.
49. Svetlana Gorshenina and Claude Rapin, De Kaboul à Samarcande: les archéologues en 
Asie centrale (P.: Gallimard, 2001); Taline Ter Minassian, Erevan: La Construction D’une 
Capitale À L’époque Soviétique (Rennes: PUR, 2007).
50. Serrano, “Religion, pouvoir, identités en Géorgie post‑soviétique,” 45‑46.
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to three formative episodes in Brezhnev’s life, the official ghost‑writers paint 
the portrait of an average Soviet citizen that anyone could identify with, since he 
embodied a combination of all the popular figures in society: worker, son of a 
peasant, combatant, technician, the General Secretary personified upward social 
mobility and undemanding consensus.
But identification with past heroes and Brezhnev himself was hardly enough to 
constitute the self‑representations of the last generations of Soviet citizens. The lack 
of any horizon of expectancy, largely due to the standardisation of codes during the 
Brezhnev years (assimilation of socialist values, routine role of the Party and highly 
conventional organisation structures) and to socio‑economic stability, prevented 
many having a tangible, positive perception of the future. The impression of an 
unchanging regime was the most frequent one among the Soviet citizens of the 
“last generation” and some of them slipped away into chimerical visions exem‑
plified in works of science fiction.51 The USSR produced its own science fiction 
books and films, from the novels of the Strugatskii brothers to Tarkovskii’s Stalker. 
In nearby socialist Bulgaria, they even showed the cult American film Star Wars, 
whose reception Nadège Ragaru details with its many facets. She rejects the implic‑
itly “dissident” interpretation of audiences thirsting for alternatives to the Socialist 
model, and demonstrates that the enthusiasm for George Lucas’s science fiction 
narrative was not so much a fascination with an imagined West as an expression 
of doubt about the common challenges of a world of technology. This dream of a 
world beyond blocs was a sort of nostalgia for the future: after national enthusiasm 
at the space exploits of the Thaw, the Soviet Union’s heroes were dying (Gagarin 
and Korolev) and worries were growing about the cost of space exploration at a 
time of political stagnation.52
As in other industrialised countries, Soviet society in the late 1970s was increas‑
ingly confining itself within a present that offered no hope of a better future and was 
no longer unanimously agreed on its connections to the past, except to the Second 
World War, a new foundation period replacing that of the Revolution.53 The vision 
of history contained in official history was being attacked from both sides: the 
culture of factographic memory made the past not the origin of the future but rather 
a repository of observations for immediate consumption. And the disappearance 
of a Communism on the horizon sent each individual back to their own contingent 
circumstances. This sense of infinite presentism typical of industrial societies may 
explain Yurchak’s line, “Everything was forever.”
51. Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More.
52. Asif A. Siddiqi, The Red Rockets’ Glare: Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 
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Conclusion
The fact remains, however, that our inability to examine policy documents (from 
Party or government, at all levels of the administration), the total closure of the 
central archives of the KGB, army, MVD, and the military‑industrial complex, and 
our severely restricted access to the papers of the ministries of industry, statistics, 
finance, budget and planning make it hard for historians to undertake a straightfor‑
ward study of the Brezhnev years, much harder than for the 1920s to 1950s.54 This 
largely explains the relative lack of historiographical interest in the period, since 
research is hampered by the lack of written evidence.55 The difficulty of accessing 
documents dealing with painful and embarrassing issues — KGB surveillance, 
the shadow cast by the penitentiary system over society and the economy, army 
barracks life, poverty in rural Russia — throws a veil over the daily life of those 
on the margins. As a result, there is the risk of emphasising the normality of Soviet 
life by focusing on the educated urban classes rather than outsiders both urban 
and rural. The research based on interviews of people from a fairly homogenous 
background — the educated and socially privileged elite in major cities — tends to 
do just that. Conversely, the papers by Florin, Swain and Chida introduce a degree 
of social, geographical and national diversity that is often lacking in studies of the 
Brezhnev years.56 However, this inability to use documentary evidence of political, 
economic, foreign policy and military decision‑making, which is likely to continue, 
does provide an incentive to innovate and seek alternative sources. And that is what 
the authors we have brought together have attempted, by either taking interviews as 
a major corpus or mobilising previously unused collections of documents.
Despite these failings of historiography and the nuances required to portray any 
period, we may make so bold as to replace the term “stagnation” for the Brezhnev 
years by that of “apogee” or “heyday.” True, the gap between major social changes 
(urbanisation, feminisation, more education, consumption) and political immo‑
bility did justify Mikhail Gorbachev’s introduction of the term “stagnation” into 
political discourse to censure his predecessors and contrast with his own movement 
of “acceleration” (uskorenie). He rightly attacked the inability of the political lead‑
ership to respond to the growing discontent of the educated classes and the experts 
who pointed out structural problems and suggested solutions.57
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But seen through the experience of most Soviet citizens, whether synchro‑
nously or diachronously, the Brezhnev period meant years of family and personal 
happiness that was at last predictable, lives no longer tossed back and forth by 
war and revolution, happiness that seemed all the more achievable now that the 
Communist horizon in the most dogmatic sense had disappeared. This stability in 
people’s life‑stories accounts for the nostalgia for “advanced socialism” expressed 
by many post‑Soviet citizens today, especially when compared with what they see 
as the wretched daily lives of tens of millions in Eastern Europe. Aside from this 
hindsight assessment, the USSR under Brezhnev did indeed experience a sort of 
social pacification, at the cost of strict law enforcement mainly against petty crime, 
but also because of negotiable arrangements at local level for social, economic 
and professional activities. For all the structural malfunctions of the economy and 
the regime’s inability to reform itself, the popularisation of consumer culture after 
decades of severe, chronic shortages, led to a civilisation of leisure in which holi‑
days, travel, sport, creation and entertainment were extending the possibilities for 
personal fulfilment. These activities often sowed the seeds of autonomous action in 
new social settings and new subjective awarenesses that would blossom at the end 
of the Soviet era. 
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